Public spaces by definition belong to those who temporarily or permanently occupy them. When designed with their citizens’ needs in mind, they successfully fulfil their duties: ease of orientation, access to public transport, temporary rest and cover, and connectivity to other parts of the city.
Their purposes and uses are varied. Some are intended to be used briefly, perhaps serving only as a place of transit, or meeting. Others allow for extended use. Those spaces which are interacted with daily occupy an important space in citizens’ mental maps, both in their intended public use and emotional significance.
The names of these spaces are often much more than letters on a plaque. They carry meaning to both the citizens who use them and the political powers that name and shape them. Because the names of these places occupy a space in citizens’ mental maps, it allows political powers to send messages to those who regularly interact with them. The messages are designed either to usurp certain people, events and places, or to reduce their importance. This allows political powers to use urban toponyms to craft an officially dictated narrative about a city and make connections to a greater national narrative.
Names of public spaces have an inconspicuous narrative power. With political propaganda, or any other type of narrative, messages can be ignored or avoided. 1 However, this is not the case with urban toponyms as they are present in citizens’ daily lives. Besides telling citizens of their orientation in the city’s space, they function as as one of the most direct ideological communication devices for a state power.
The construction of collective identity happens through shared symbols and representations. Connections to a set of shared national symbols evoke feelings of belonging and unity, helping to homogenise a society. 2 National identities, as discussed by Bellamy, ‘are not simply abstract sets of ideas, but are embodied in the material day-to-day lived experiences of people.’ 3 Urban toponyms allow ideology to become embedded in the lived experiences of national subjects by being part of the everyday. They offer crucial insights into the values of a political regime.
When new national identities are being formed – or existing, fluctuating national identities are being expanded – the ideological machinery of government utilises available devices at hand.
This essay explores Croatian post-socialist identity building in the early 1990s and the role of urban toponyms in this process. The focus will be on identity rebuilding as imagined and perpetrated by the first Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and his political party Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, or HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union).
The renaming of public spaces is persistent with changes in political regimes, especially those prompted by revolution or war. Each new regime will implant their preferred symbols, embedding their particular values in the everyday. It is an opportunity to manipulate public memory by modelling history from a position of power. 4
Renaming destabilises the construction of both collective and personal identities, making national identity: ‘a site of political contestation.’ 5 Inconsistent and a product of multiple simultaneous ongoing projects, 6 national identity’s precarious qualities make it susceptible to be crafted and reinvented by each political regime. Through the process of renaming, the values of the past are erased, destroyed and ultimately forgotten.
The focus of narratives of national scale is to maintain that the state has always been culturally unified. This can be achieved by attempting to erase memories and elements which point to the contrary. 7 Together, space and ideology build an image of a linear national identity. There is no space for contradictions or opposing values. Linearity and continuity are most important in the narratives of national scale and importance.
The focus of this essay will be Zagreb, Croatia’s capital city. Precisely because of its status as a national capital, urban toponyms in Zagreb are crafted to tell a particular narrative of national identity. Regional identities don’t play a role in the toponyms, nor have historical, cultural or political traditions. 8
To understand why particular renamings occurred, it is important to understand the cultural and political background in which they occurred.
Croatian national identity has been shaped by a complex history between cultural and historic divides. Throughout its history, Croatia was on the crossroad between Byzantine, Catholic, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian spheres of influence. This situates it between Europe and the Balkans – or more broadly, between East and West. 9
The influences of multiple cultures and civilisations are reflected in the Croatian political nationalism that emerged after the country declared independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. 10 The ideology largely utilises Balkanist 11 rhetoric, defining and constructing itself against an Other: Balkan, Yugoslavia and Serbia.
In Croatian society, Balkan plays an important and central role in the way the society perceives itself. Barbaric, violent and foreign, Balkan is the opposite of Europe. 12 Particularly for Croats, there is great sensibility around being identified as part of the Balkans; the narrative being that Europe is our true home, and that being part of Yugoslavia guided Croats away from this ideal.
In the national consciousness, Yugoslavia is equalised with the Balkans and being ‘Balkan’. Yugoslavia’s defining social qualities – a multiethnic and multi-religious society – are also qualities applicable to the Ottoman Empire. There is a great public sensibility that any kind of diverse, decentralised union is intrinsically a Balkan quality. On the contrary, modern European nation-states are defined by a centralised state system and a single unified national culture – a project that Croatia achieved much later than most of Europe. 13
In the first multi-party elections in the 1990s, the Communist party suffered a loss to HDZ. As victors, the party had access to the bureaucratic power of the state, allowing them to enforce their particular understanding of Croatian national identity. 14 Although organised opposition existed, mostly from liberal and socialist parties, HDZ was able to suppress expression of their views. The opposition accused Franjo Tudjman – head of HDZ and the first president-elect – of Balkanising Croatia. HDZ called upon Croats to ‘reclaim their true Central European identity and vote for liberal democratic change.’ 15
At the start of the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001), Croatia was seen as a victim of Serbian aggression by the international community. This changed when Tudjman supported Croatian secessionists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 16 War against Muslims was cloaked in the rhetoric of protecting Croatian national interests, as was the suppression of criticism and fighting against extradition of indicted war criminals. This contributed to a decline in Croatia’s international standing as well as the perception of Tudjman’s politics as a suppressive regime. 17 By the late 1990s Western leaders saw Croatia as another autocratic and expansionist ‘Balkan’ regime. 18 For states like Croatia, where the strongest cultural desire is to be European, Balkanism is an effective method of disciplining. 19
At the brink of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, USA and EU initiated the South-East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to promote economic exchange with Europe’s South-East. The media, controlled by Tudjman, had reported on this as a world conspiracy to force Croatia ‘back onto the Balkans’. 20 Tudjman presented himself as the liberator of Croatia’s Balkan burden, returning it to its rightful place in Europe. In 1997 he ultimately passed a constitutional amendment banning Croatian participation in Balkan associations. 21
Croatia’s relationship to the Balkans is best reflected in the renaming of one of the best known and central cinemas in Zagreb. Prior to being renamed Cinema Europe in the early 1990s, it was known as Cinema Balkan. Built in 1924 by the wealthy Müller family, it was designed by architect Srećko Florschütz ‘with the aim of constructing the most beautiful, important and modern cinema in the region.’ 22
This renaming was emblematic of Croatia attempting to redefine which region it considered itself to be a part of. Although not a public space, Cinema Europe was a symbol of a political transformation so exhaustive that even cultural institutions went through a symbolic reshaping.
The renaming of urban spaces followed a logical trajectory when the square located next to cinema Europe was renamed.
Although the square is colloquially referred to as Flower Square – it was once a marketplace where flowers were sold, though a few flower kiosks symbolically remain – it is officially named after Petar Preradović, one of the most important poets of the Illyrian movement (1835–1863). This was a cultural and political movement with focus on revival of Slavic languages, culture and traditions. Illyrians rejected the Habsburg Empire’s control, reviving their native languages and cultures.
Preradović identified himself as a Croat of Orthodox faith. 23 Religion is an important cultural and ethnic signifier – Croats are Catholics, Serbs are Orthodox. Preradović’s identification as a Croat of Orthodox faith demonstrates Croatia’s position on those of Orthodox faith. They are welcomed, as long as they identify as Croats.
During Yugoslavia, the square carried the name Brotherhood and Unity square. Brotherhood and Unity was a doctrine used by the Communists to promote an ethnically-unified Yugoslavia and suppress nationalism. The fact that the oldest Orthodox Church in Zagreb is there was used by the communists to evoke an idyllic relationship between Yugoslav peoples, especially Croats and Serbs. 24
In the decade after the Croatian Homeland War, Croatia’s EU accession talks were stalled due to discriminatory politics toward Serb national minority. EU issued sanctions and warnings, postponing the accession. This led to a shift in the perception and ultimately, albeit under international pressure, it was accepted that ethnic Serbs were also part of the national culture. 25
Significantly, Nikola Tesla - born in Croatia, but an ethnic Serb - came into the foreground in the post-socialist sphere, particularly the discussion about Tesla’s ethnicity. Was he a Serb or a Croat? In a symbolic gesture, Ivan Meštrović’s sculpture of a thinking Nikola Tesla was moved in 2006 from a peripheral location to the very centre of Zagreb, a short walk away from the Flower Square. 26
In 1991, Croatia was recognised as a sovereign state for the first time in its national history. 27 The bloody quest for independence drew analogies to other moments in history when Croatia had achieved what it was battling for in the 1990s.
The main aspect of Croatia’s nation-building myth is historical statehood. 28 Croatia has achieved statehood twice in its history: as a medieval kingdom and as a Nazi puppet state during WWII. The narrative of historical statehood was mobilised and reinterpreted by various political parties in the 1990’s for the purpose of validating their political programmes. 29
Public spaces’ physical properties - length, width, position - will determine which symbol will be allocated to it. More important symbols will be given more important locations. 30 Statehood is therefore assigned to the central square in Zagreb - Trg Bana Jelačića (Ban Jelačić Square), first named as such in 1848. An accompanying sculpture of the Ban was installed in 1866. Ban Jelačić abolished serfdom and brought Croatian historical lands - Dalmatia, Slavonia and Croatia Proper-under one rule, albeit existing under wider foreign rule. Although a loyal servant to the Habsburg Empire, he was also engaged in the Illyrian movement. However, he did not envision an independent South Slavic nation-state. 31 The square carried his name until 1946 when it was renamed The Republic Square. The statue was removed the following year by the communist authority. Because Marx deemed him a reactionary, Jelačić was not ideologically compatible with the Communist ideology. 32 For the communists, the square symbolised Austrian control over Croatia as opposed to the Yugoslav idea of united South Slavic peoples. Ban Jelačić’s Croat-oriented political agenda was deemed dangerous and in opposition to the ideology of Brotherhood and Unity.
In the 1990s, the name Ban Jelačić Square was restored, along with his monument, symbolising the importance of united Croatian lands under one rule. Regardless of ideological and political contradictions, he personifies the emergence of Croatian and South Slavic national aspirations. 33
Although Ban Jelačić is a symbol, he has very little meaning to modern-day Croatia. Perhaps the most important is the sense of lineage and historical continuity that he invokes. The square has changed relatively little compared to other central squares, having returned to its original name after the fall of socialism. It is obvious that Ban is a historic figure, one which says that the history of Croatia as a nation-state is not merely few decades old, but it quite clearly predates Yugoslavia. Jelačić not only existed prior to Yugoslavia, but he was also decided to be important before the nation-building of the 1990s took place.
The statue of Jelačić is not only a symbol of Croatian statehood, but also the most significant site for production and reproduction of nationhood. 34 The square has become the epicentre for displays of national pride - some threatening, some heartwarming. It is the most effective ideological force in the Croatian public landscape.
Historical statehood was also utilised in the most controversial renaming: the Meštrović pavilion which embodies the distortion and denial of fascist crimes. During WW II Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia, Croatia became a nazi puppet state known as the Independent State of Croatia - the NDH (Nezavisna država Hrvatska). Ruled by ultranationalist Ante Pavelić, NDH encompassed most of present-day Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 35 Pavelić fiercely opposed the pan-Slavic idea of united South Slavic peoples. Not only did he oppose it, but to circumvent Hitler’s anti-Slavic sentiment and racial theories (Romas, Jews and Slavs are subhuman), he claimed Croats were descendants of Goths, rather than Slavs.
Precisely because Ustashi achieved nation statehood, history had to be rewritten in order to legitimise it. At the heart of Croatian revisionism is Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti (The Horrors of War), published by Tudjman in 1989. 36 Tudjman said that NDH: ‘had not only been a fascist creation but also an expression of centuries-old desire of the Croatian people for an independent state.’ 37 Communist crimes were to be emphasised, and Ustasha crimes were in some instances denied, downplayed or distorted. 2,964 public monuments to the Ustashi and Nazi victims were destroyed or removed at the start of the Yugoslav wars. 38
There are very few buildings which show the interconnection between state politics, ideology and culture better than Džamija. The complex and charged relationship has continuously shaped the building’s function and design. In the post-socialist sphere it embodies the Fascist-Communist binary.
The Meštrović Pavilion, colloquially known as Džamija (mosque), is one of Zagreb’s most known architectural landmarks, located at the Victims of Fascism Square. The building sits at the centre of the square, surrounded by neatly-kept grass. Named after acknowledged sculptor Ivan Meštrović who designed the building, it has been a site of controversial and highly-politicised conversions throughout its history. It was built in 1938 by using more than 2,500 tonnes of esteemed white stone from the island of Brač. 39 Supported by a ring of thirty-six columns, the circular building has a large glass dome though which light shines through. Today, the building serves as the Home of Croatian Artists.
The square it is located at was built in the 1920s and named Square N. The symbolic newness and neutrality of the name was stripped when it became tied to the definite political structures in power, being renamed King Petar I Karadjordjević Square in 1929. 40 After the defeat of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established to protect the south Slavic national interests.
Karadjordjević was to be commemorated by a monument, the design of which was put in charge of Ivan Meštrović. Meštrović insisted that a building, rather than a statue would be a wiser decision. Considering political unrests, he stressed that the monument could be removed if political changes happened. 41 He envisioned the building to have a dual purse - a home for the visual artists and a monument to the King.
Following the Nazi occupation and establishment of NDH in 1941, the square was renamed Square III and the fine art house was transformed into a mosque. The mosque was intended as a symbolic gift to the Muslim population in NDH, integrating them fully into the new state. 42 The building’s structure remained the same, but three minarets were installed around the building.
Following the Partisan liberation of the city in 1945, the square was renamed to Victims of Fascism Square. Minarets were removed in the following years and the building was repurposed as a Museum of the People’s Revolution.
In 1990 the square was renamed once more to The Square of Great Croats. Opposed by many and perceived as a rejection of Croatia’s anti-fascist legacy, this was by far the most meaningful renaming, resulting in an active public movement to restore the previous name.
Criticism was shunned away by the government, stating that the renaming was in service of reconciliation of the entire Croatian nation, and this also included anti-fascists. 43 Those in favour had argued that anti-fascism in Croatia was associated with the Communist regime, which was also responsible for multitudes of victims. 44
After a decade, In 2000, persistent public efforts have succeeded to return the square’s previous name - Victims of fascism square.
At the same time, unrests started around anther central square. Fascist-Communist binary structure is also present in the public discussions around Trg maršala Tita (Marshal Tito Square).
In under 150 years, this square has undergone seven renamings. At and around the square, many cultural institutions lie. National Theatre building lies at the centre of the square, surrounded by a U-shaped architectural landscape. The square carried the name Kazališni trg (Theatre Square) for one year only (1945-1946), however this was the most rememberable name as it is often used colloquially.
In 1946 the square was renamed to Marshal Tito Square by the Communists. It carried this name until 2017 when it was renamed Trg Republike Hrvatske (Republic of Croatia Square).
The name of Marshal Tito, arguably the strongest symbols of Yugoslavia, persisted over two decades after Croatia became an independent republic. Red stars and monuments dedicated to leaders of workers movements and solidarity were all quickly taken down or destroyed. However, Tito persisted to have one of the most important squares in Zagreb. By many, he was seen as the glue which held the federation together. Half-Croat and half-Slovene, he himself was symbolic of Yugoslav identity.
Tito’s importance to local history (as opposed to Yugoslav history) is due to the fact he led the Partisan movement. Because the Communist revolution was internal in Croatia, and directly in opposition to fascist Ante Pavelić, Tito is for many, still, a symbol of Croatia’s anti-fascist legacy.
In 2008, about 2000 protesters gathered demanding the square be renamed to Theatre Square, chanting ‘Tito, a criminal’. 45 The opposition, about 200 protesters, were there to stand in defence of the square’s name, reminding people of Tito’s anti-fascist legacy. Police mediated between two protest groups. The Mayor of Zagreb, Milan Bandić, then said there was no historical reason to change square’s name. The same major changed his mind in 2017, stating a name change will be suggested to the City of Zagreb Assembly. 46 Renaming was officially completed in September of the same year when was renamed as the Republic of Croatia Square
The official narrative might be clear, however, citizens have participated in speaking their truths about the space (regardless of what they were influenced by). The renaming of core areas has an emotional impact on citizens. Because core spaces are frequented more often than the periphery, public reactions also differ. Central squares will prompt stronger reactions. Various protest throughout the two decades after Croatian independence have shown citizens’ interest in engagement with the process of renaming. Public unrests and protests were in service of protecting and remembering values and symbols which the ruling ideology was trying to erase.
Through colloquial knowledge and citizen’s private memory, forgotten square names continue to live on. Such is example of the Meštrović Pavilion. Despite going through multiple ideological transformation and function-changes, the citizens at large refer to the building as Džamiija, despite it being the shortest-lived purpose. The Pavilion is a place that has never seemed to find a permanent identity and has always been contrived to be something else. Even now, the square’s intended use is changing. It barely fulfils the role of a public space: benches and ornamental horticulture is being removed, dog-walkers are now banned from setting foot on the neatly-kept grass.
Ban Jelačić Square stands in stark contrast. Certainly, it being the main and historic square grants it better and more frequent public use. However, it is also the main space for the outpouring of Croatian nationalism. It is the place where protests and events of national importance happen. It is the foremost effective site for (re)production of nationhood. 47 The statue of Jelačić has historic allure exemplifying Croatia as a historic nation-state. Perhaps most important is that Jelačić evokes a feeling of Croatian national lineage, and the sense of a culturally and politically unified Croatia. Jelačić’s monument and square achieve what they were set to do, evoking feelings of belonging, unity and pride in Croatian statehood, whatever that may ultimately mean to an individual.
Endnotes
1 Marjanović, “Change of political power”, 109-110.
2 Ibid., 108.
3 Bellamy, The formation of Croatian national identity, 2.
4 Marjanović, “Change of political power”, 110.
5 Bellamy, The formation of Croatian national identity, 179.
6 Ibid., 180.
7 Kameda, “Collective Memory of Communism”, 114.
8 Stiperski, et al. “Identity through Urban Nomenclature”, 186.
9 Razsa, Lindstrom, “Balkan Is Beautiful”, 648.
10 Bellamy, The formation of Croatian national identity, 171.
11 Balkanism was coined by Maria Todorova in 1997. It is a system of representations established by the West and Europe to construct a positive image of oneself in contrast to the Balkan ‘other’.
12 Kameda, “Collective Memory of Communism”, 107.
13 Razsa, Lindstrom, “Balkan Is Beautiful”, 647.
14 Bellamy, The formation of Croatian national identity, 177.
15 Ibid., 177.
16 Razsa, Lindstrom, “Balkan Is Beautiful”, 633.
17 Ibid., 629-630.
18 Ibid., 634.
19 Ibid., 629-630.
20 Ibid., 640.
21 Ibid., 640.
22 “About cinema.”
23 Stiperski, et al. “Identity through Urban Nomenclature”, 186.
24 Ibid., 186.
25 Stanić, Šakaja, “Other(ing), self(portraying), negotiating”, 501.
26 Ibid., 501.
27 Razsa, Lindstrom, “Balkan Is Beautiful”, 628.
28 Bellamy, The formation of Croatian national identity, 1.
29 Ibid., 1.
30 Stiperski, et al. “Identity through Urban Nomenclature”, 181.
31 Walton, “The Ban’s mana”, 693.
32 Stiperski, et al. “Identity through Urban Nomenclature”, 183.
33 Ibid., 688.
34 Walton, “The Ban’s mana”, 693.
35 Goldstein, Goldstein, “Revisionism in Croatia”, 52.
36 Ibid., 56.
37 Ibid., 63.
38 Ibid., 63.
39 Demark, “Meštrović Pavilion”
40 Majača, Bago, “The Meštrović Pavilion”, 307.
41 Ibid., 308.
42 Ibid., 309.
43 Ibid., 313.
44 Ibid., 313.
45 “Thousands of Croatians rally against Tito Square.”
46 Ibid.
47 Walton, “The Ban’s mana”, 693.
Bibliography
“About cinema,” Kino Europa, accessed May 1, 2021, https://kinoeuropa.hr/arhiva/en/about-cinema/
Azaryahu, Maoz, Foote, Kenneth E. “Historical space as narrative medium: on the configuration of spatial narratives of time at historical sites.” GeoJournal (November 2008) DOI: 10.1007/s10708-008-9202-4
B92. "Thousands of Croatians rally against Tito Square.” Accessed May 1, 2021. https://www.b92.net/eng/news/region.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=10&nav_id=47607
Bellamy, Alex J. The formation of Croatian national identity - A centuries-old dream. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Đurašković, Stevo. “National identity-building and the “Ustaša-nostalgia” in Croatia: the past that will not pass.” Nationalities Papers (2016) 44(5): 772-788. DOI:10.1080/00905992.2016.1171301
Goldstein, Ivo, Goldstein, Slavko. “Revisionism in Croatia: The case of Franjo Tudjman.” East European Jewish Affairs, 32(1): 52-64. DOI: 10.1080/13501670208577963
Kameda, Masumi. “Collective Memory of Communism in Croatia since 1994: Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Arts and National Narratives.” History of Communism in Europe 1: 105-115. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=188325
Majača, Antoniija, Bago, Ivana. “The Meštrović Pavilion and the Square Around It: A Chronology of Renaming and the Battle for History.” The Renaming Machine, edited by Suzana Milevska, 306-323. Ljubljana: P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Institute, 2010.
Marjanović, Bojan. “Promjena vlasti, promjena ulica” [Change of political power, change of streets]. Diskrepencija 8, no.12 (January 2007): 105-127.
Nikolina Demark. “Meštrović Pavilion: Turbulent History of Iconic Zagreb Landmark” Accessed Maz 1 2021. https://www.total-croatia-news.com/zagreb-blog/18573-mestrovic-pavilion-turbulent-history-of-iconic-zagreb-landmark
Razsa, Maple, Lindstrom, Nicole. “Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political Discourse of Tudman's Croatia.” East European Politics and Societies 18(4): 628-650, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325404266939
Rose-Redwood, Reuben, Alderman, Derek, Azaryahu, Maoz. “Geographies of toponymic inscription: new directions in critical place-name studies.” Progress in Human Geography 34(4 (2010): 453–470. DOI: 10.1177/0309132509351042
Stanić, Jelena. “Prostor i ideologija” [Space and ideology]. Migracijske i etničke teme 25 (2009): 89–124.
Stanić, Jelena, Šakaja, Laura. “Other(ing), self(portraying), negotiating: the spatial codification of values in Zagreb’s city-text.” Cultural geographies 18(4): 495 –516. DOI:10.1177/1474474011414636
Stiperski, Zoran, Lorber, Lučka, Heršak, Emil, Ptaček, Pavel, Górka, Zygmunt, Kołoś, Arkadiusz, Lončar, Jelena, Faričić, Josip, Miličević, Mirjana, Vujaković, Ana et al. “Identity through Urban Nomenclature: Eight Central European Cities.” Geografisk Tidsskrift - Danish Journal of Geography, 111(2): 181-194. DOI: 10.1080/00167223.2011.10669532
Walton, Jeremy F. (2020) “The Ban’s mana: post-imperial affect and public memory in Zagreb.” Cultural Studies 34(5): 688-706. DOI: 10.1080/09502386.2020.1780285
Comments